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ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
JOHN H. JACKSON
Ernst- Ulrich Petersmann*
Thanks to the wisdom of the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), the Oxford English Dictionary has been cited in
almost every appellate report since 1995 and is emerging as one of the
leading sources for the interpretation of WTO law. It is only fitting,
therefore, to begin this tribute to John-as the most authoritative aca-
demic author on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), WTO and international economic law over now three dec-
ades since the publication of his World Trade and the Law of
GA Ti (still widely referred to as "GATT bible" all over the world)-
with a reference to this Oxford source of WTO wisdom. The term
"constitution" can be used, according to the Oxford Dictionary, not only
for the principles governing a polity or other organization, but also for
the structure and condition of a person. This contribution begins with a
brief reflection on the constitution of John Jackson as a friend, followed
by a few thoughts on John's written work on national and international
constitutional law and policy. The analysis confirms what we all know:
the liberal and cosmopolitan personalities and ethics of John and his
wife Joan, are inseparably interwoven with his constitutional concept of
how to improve law and policy for the benefit of the citizens; and
John's intellectual curiosity, energy and commitment to improving the
effectiveness of rules and policies promise ongoing "constitutional dia-
logues" in the years to come among John and his many friends and legal
disciples all over the world.
I came across the books and other publications of John Jackson in
the 1970s when, as research fellow at the Heidelberg Max-Planck-
Institute for International and Comparative Public Law, I published arti-
cles on "The New Law of North-South Trade" and a contribution to the
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law on "International Gov-
ernmental Trade Organizations-GATT and UNCTAD." John's classic
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treatise on World Trade and the Law of GATT clearly differed from the
writings of all other scholars about international trade law and policy in
several respects:
the analysis was unprecedented as regards his comprehen-
sive empirical approach taking into account all relevant
GATT documents and analyzing in great detail all relevant
GATT practices; for more than thirty years, John's writings
have remained characterized by his microscopic interest
also in legal details and by his first-hand information, based
on his close personal contacts to GATT and WTO staff
members and trade policy-makers in the United States, the
European Community and many other countries;
unlike the ivory-towered "legalism" of many international
lawyers, and the no less abstract "economism" of many
economists, John's writings are truly interdisciplinary and
policy-oriented: there is probably no other international law
professor who has so visibly influenced the law and practice
of a worldwide organization over more than three decades
as John Jackson;
John's work also differed from other books on GATT by his
emphasis on a "rule-oriented" rather than "power-oriented"
approach to international relations;
even though John's practical experience as legal counsel in
the U.S. Trade Representative's (then, U.S. Special Repre-
sentative for Trade) Office, and his admiration of the U.S.
constitutional system, are reflected in many of his analyses,
he has carried out-probably more than any other interna-
tional economic lawyer-numerous comparative legal
analyses of the constitutional systems and trade legislation
of other GATT and WTO member countries;
perhaps most importantly, John's work goes beyond the tra-
ditional "statist conceptions" of classical international
lawyers and applies a citizen-oriented "constitutional ap-
proach," taking into account the needs of traders, producers,
investors, and consumers, as well as the need for democratic
legitimacy and constitutional checks of international rules
and organizations.
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John's 1969 treatise on GATT law ends with a far-sighted chapter
on "The Constitutional Structure of a Possible International Trade In-
stitution," culminating in the following conclusion:
The perpetual puzzle and the expensive struggle of international
economic institutions is to try to sift out the "wheat from the
chaff," i.e. to give measured scope for legitimate national policy
goals while preventing use of these goals to promote particular
interests at the expense of the greater common welfare. An ad-
ditional function of the international institutions is that of any
government unit-to allow a society of persons or nations to
organize in such a way as to enable its members to pursue
common goals without being defeated by competing antisocial
conduct of members of the group.... What is needed in an in-
stitution ... is the structure and machinery to enable man as
efficiently as possible to pursue the "sifting" function men-
tioned above as well as the pursuit of common goals... In the
long run, it may well be the machinery that is most important
(i.e. the procedures), rather than the existence of any one or an-
other specific rule of trade conduct.
2
Reading these lines, in the late 1970s, influenced not only the
choice of the subject and of its constitutional and comparative law ap-
proach for my "habilitation book," Constitutional Functions and
Constitutional Problems of International Economic Law-Foreign
Trade Law and Policy in the United States, Switzerland and the EC. It
also contributed to my acceptance of an offer, in 1980, to start working
inside "the machinery" of the GATT Secretariat as the first legal officer
ever employed by the GATT (which formally established a "legal of-
fice" only in 1983). In 1981, I met John for the first time personally at
Geneva on the occasion of his annual visit to the GATT Secretariat. One
of the first pieces of advice I received personally from John was on the
use of computers used in the GATT Secretariat-he mastered the
"GATT machinery" in all respects, including its most technical details.
By coincidence, the Jackson family had rented an apartment in the same
building where we lived, and my wife Dorothee had already met John's
wife when Joan looked desperately for help to explain the jointly used
washing machine. The following evening was the first in a long series of
joyful evening invitations by the Jackson family in Geneva and, in later
years, also in Ann Arbor. Dinners and discussions at the Jackson family
remain unforgettable due to the same personal features that characterize
John's writings: sincere sympathy and curiosity for all details of human
2. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 788.
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life; frank and prudent balancing of all arguments; focus on principles
and their ethical foundations; and practical concern for alleviating social
problems.
One of several academic conferences organized jointly by Meinhard
Hilf, John Jackson, and myself was on "National Constitutions and In-
ternational Economic Law." John contributed, inter alia, some
"summary reflections" on "agreed propositions," "fundamental differ-
ences in approaches," and "proposals."3 He identified the following five
agreed assumptions:
First, the "strong link between international law and national
constitutional systems, which must be understood in order to
understand the international economic system as it evolves to-
day and in the future."4
Second, the objective of making more effective the policies and
basic goal of the international trade system "to liberalize trade
on the whole to take advantage of the economic theories of
comparative advantage and economies of scale."5
Third, that many of the obstacles to trade liberalization exist
within national political and legal structures that affect transna-
tional economic law and policy, in particular various interest
groups and 'rent-seekers' which "often have an influence in ex-
cess of their proportionate share of the economies or national
political systems."6
Fourth, that the dynamic evolution of international trade law
towards greater world interdependence among nations and
among economic systems entails "progressively developing
higher levels of detail of international regulation."7
Fifth, that "the international trade system must be 'rule oriented'
as opposed to 'power-oriented;' " our conference discussions fo-
cused on "how to make the rules more effective ... in the face
3. John H. Jackson, National Constitutions, Transnational Economic Policy and Inter-
national Economic Law: Some Summary Reflections, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 569-576 (M. Hilf & E.U. Petersmann eds., 1993).
4. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 570.
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of the domestic interest groups, or 'rent seekers' who have
sought to reduce trade liberalization so as to enhance their own
economic profits, rents and positions."8
John also identified three "fundamental differences in approaches to
international law":
* International law in Europe seems to be much more impor-
tant than it is in many parts of the world, particularly in the
United States. This is partly a result of many centuries of
development in Europe, with many small countries who
must interact with each other under a framework of interna-
tional law rules.9
" Many Europeans are trained in civil law thinking, which in
broad brush might be characterized as "top-down thinking"
about legal propositions. In addition, Europeans tend to
have a somewhat different view about the role of elites,
particularly in international affairs, perhaps giving greater
deference to the activity of elite participants than might be
the case, for example in the United States.t °
* For most people from the U.S., there is considerable faith in
the U.S. Constitution and the stability of the political sys-
tem, a faith which many people from the U.S. do not share
when it comes to international law and international institu-
tions. To some extent, international law is viewed as
peripheral, and even dangerous, with a potential for inter-
fering with some of the finer aspects of the U.S.
constitutional legal system... those from the U.S. ... tend
to be somewhat more skeptical about the value of interna-
tional law becoming effective in domestic law systems. In
addition, certain aspects of the U.S. constitutional history
allow those from the U.S. to be somewhat more skeptical
about easily amending a constitution, or introducing into a
constitution a protection of economic rights as compared to
human rights. "
The remainder of John's "summary reflections" focused on his wor-
ries and viewpoints on some of the constitutional proposals that have
remained controversial in academic conferences and political negotia-
8. Id. at 572.
9. Id. at 573.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 573, 574.
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tions in regional and worldwide organizations like the WTO. John fo-
cused on the following two constitutional concerns.
First, as regards the proposal of national and international constitu-
tional guarantees of freedom of trade across frontiers: "there is a worry
that such an approach is essentially undemocratic," "may not suit demo-
cratic constituencies over a long period of time," and may be too
favorable to special interests "compared to the broader needs of the na-
tion;" moreover, an amendment of the U.S. Constitution to this effect
would be politically impractical in the foreseeable future; the alternative
approach of a reciprocal international free trade agreement "would not
ensure constitutionalization of the treaty norm, since in the U.S. later-in-
time statutes would prevail," and international treaty norms are imple-
mented in different ways in different countries.'2
Second, concerning the "constitutional functions" of international
guarantees of freedom of trade for protecting private freedom across
frontiers: John views "international law as instrumental," and prefers to
downplay "a view that international law somehow has an inherent status
higher than national constitutions or national political processes." John
shares "a fair amount of skepticism about international law, since in
many cases its effectiveness leaves much to be desired;" he thinks:
it is better to avoid the rigidity of constitutional measures to re-
inforce trading goals, and also the rigidity of constitutional
structures which provide for direct application of international
treaty norms as well as a higher status for those norms in the le-
gal system... international treaty norms might well be
designed so that they would be sufficiently attractive to na-
tional-level political constituencies for national legal systems to
provide the "act of transformation" to incorporate the treaty
norm in those systems, albeit subject to later alteration if the
norms prove to be not optimal.'3
John's "summary reflections" are an admirable illustration of his
analytical sharpness and prudent balancing of arguments, avoiding ex-
treme positions. It is no less characteristic for John that he has continued
to reconsider and probe these constitutional arguments in many of his
subsequent writings. As a result,
12. Id. at 575.
13. Id. at 576.
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" some of the above-mentioned "agreed assumptions" have
been defined more generally, such as that "understanding an
international legal system necessitates understanding the
relationship of national and political systems to that inter-
national system;"' 4
" the policy considerations relating to the legal status and ef-
fects of international treaties in domestic law have been
explored in a very systematic and comprehensive manner
"on the basis of empirical and pragmatic considerations,"15
leading to the "basic conclusion ... that there are sound
policy reasons for a national legal system with typical
democratic institutions to avoid the combination of direct
domestic law application of treaties and higher status for
those treaty norms than later-enacted statutory law;"' 6 and
" the functional interrelationships between national constitu-
tional procedures and the "domestic law status" of
international treaties have been defined more precisely,
based on John's insight that the above-mentioned
"conclusion depends greatly on the relative degree to which
constitution drafters trust international institutions and
treaty-making processes compared with national institutions
and legislative processes. '
A central premise in John's constitutional thinking remains his
view, already emphasized in the above-mentioned concluding sentence
of his 1969 "GATT bible" that procedures may be more important than
any one or another specific rule.'8 John has explained this position with
many convincing examples. For instance,
if a constitutional treaty-making procedure does not provide for
'democratic participation' such as parliamentary approval, it
would not be surprising to find reluctance to have the treaty af-
fect domestic law until a parliament has acted (as we see in
England and some Commonwealth countries). The parliamen-
tary act can be the act of transformation, and its requirement as
part of the domestic lawmaking system can substitute in part for
14. John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis,
86 AM. J. INT'LL. 310,311 (1992).
15. Jackson, supra note 14, at 312 et seq.
16. Id. at 313.
17. Id.
18. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 788.
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the direct participation in treaty making of parliaments in other
constitutional systems.
19
Since the U.S. Constitution gives the power to make treaties to the
U.S. President "with the advice and consent of the Senate, ' 20 it seems
only logical from this perspective that John Jackson agrees with the
U.S. court practice to give priority to Congressional legislation over
conflicting international treaty rules, and that he approves of the U.S.
legislative practice to conclude and implement international agreements
by congressional acts. Concern for the due process guarantees in U.S.
constitutional law is another procedural argument mentioned by John
against direct application of vague international treaty rules by domestic
courts.2 '
The focus on procedures and due process as sources of legitimacy,
and the view that "justice" makes sense only among individuals but not
among states, have a long tradition in Anglo-American legal doctrine.22
Even though the related positivist view that law-making procedures de-
serve allegiance irrespective of the substance of the rules was strongly
rejected in the U.S. Declaration of Independence and by the founding
fathers of the U.S. Constitution, the statist and process-oriented concep-
tion of international law remains the dominant paradigm in Anglo-
American legal doctrine. Even in domestic U.S. constitutional law, the
unique experience of more than 200 years of liberal constitutional de-
mocracy in the United States seems to have prompted most U.S.
constitutional lawyers to neglect the primary concern of the founding
fathers of the U.S. Constitution, and also of many post-war constitutions
in Europe, that parliamentary assemblies may become the most danger-
ous branch of government unless they are adequately constitutionally
restrained. Notwithstanding the founding fathers' rejection of the British
Parliament's claim to "parliamentary sovereignty," and their conception
of the U.S. Constitution as a constitutionally limited democracy, the
U.S. Congress seems to assert almost unlimited powers in the foreign
policy area.23 U.S. courts have supported this trend from "constitutional
democracy" towards "parliamentary democracy" by means of judicial
19. Jackson, supra note 14, at 316.
20. U.S. CONST. Art. 2 § 2.
21. Id. at 324.
22. See e.g., THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 19 (1990)
(arguing that the legitimacy of international rules depends on "right process" rather than on
theories of justice); cf. FRANCK, supra, at 208-46.
23. See e.g., E.U. Petersmann, Limited Government and Unlimited Trade Policy Pow-
ers? Why Effective Judicial Review and a Liberal Constitution Depend on Individual Rights,
in Hilf & Petersmann, supra note 3, 537-61; E.U. PETERSMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 293-313 (1991).
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"political question" doctrines, "act of state" doctrines, "non self-
executing treaty"-theories, and "later-in-time"-rules, all designed to
justify judicial self-restraint vis-ai-vis congressional powers, notably in
the foreign policy area. In the trade policy area, this has culminated in
the long-standing U.S. jurisprudence that "when the people granted
Congress the power 'to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations' ...
they thereupon relinquished at least whatever right they, as individuals,
may have had to insist upon the importation of any product., 24 Yet: Is
such an authoritarian "Hobbesian interpretation" of the constitutional
contract, which treats citizens as mere objects of paternalistic govern-
ment, really consistent with the constitutional concept of a government
with limited powers required to "secure the blessings of liberty to" the
people of the United States?
2 5
"Can two walk together, except they be agreed? '26 I am deeply
grateful to John Jackson that, over the past eighteen years, he invited me
to accompany him so often, not only on walks around the lake of Ge-
neva but also in numerous private discussions and public conferences.
We are in agreement on numerous constitutional problems, such as the
need for scrutinizing international law rules from a constitutional per-
spective and possibly refuse compliance with them (as it was done in
the jurisprudence of American and German courts) if their application
might entail violations of human rights or of other principles of consti-
tutional law. Fortunately, John has been generous enough to walk along
with me and continue our discussions even when we obviously disa-
greed. John may have done so because he perceived process (such as
walking and discussing) as more important than substance. I tend to
emphasize, apart from due process, also the Kantian moral imperative
that political discussions and governmental processes derive democratic
legitimacy from maximizing the freedom and other equal rights of the
citizens. In order to further progress in our common search for a rule-
governed international order that constitutionally protects individual
freedom and peaceful cooperation across frontiers, I conclude this trib-
ute with a number of questions that may stimulate further discussions on
our future walks through the parks of Geneva or the Swiss mountains,
regardless of whether we agree or disagree:
24. Arjay Associates, Inc. v. Bush, 891 F.2d 894 (1989).
25. U.S. CONST., Preamble (1789).
26. Amos 3:3.
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Does constitutional democracy really require the supremacy
of laws over treaties, or their equal status so that the later in
time will prevail? Should, in a globally integrated world
where respect for the rights of U.S. citizens abroad depends
upon respect for international law, Article VI of the U.S.
Constitution ("Treaties ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land") not be construed in the sense that all the branches of
government-including the U.S. Congress-have to respect
international treaties provided they have been ratified in ac-
cordance with the Constitution? If the treaty-making power
is exercised in a democratic manner, and international guar-
antees of freedom and non-discrimination serve
"constitutional functions" for protecting freedom and non-
discrimination also for the benefit of U.S. citizens in tran-
snational relations: Is John's preference for preserving "the
option to breach the treaty"27 not neglecting the "Janus
problem" of foreign policy powers-i.e., the fact that for-
eign policy discretion to discriminate among today's 200
sovereign states entails also 200 possibilities of discrimi-
nating among domestic citizens trading with these
countries?
" What lessons are to be drawn from the historical experience
that peaceful cooperation, since the end of World War II,
among the now forty member states of the Council of
Europe was essentially achieved through the supra-national
constitutional law of the EC and the European Convention
of Human Rights? Do U.S. international lawyers offer any
alternative "constitutional strategy" for effectively promot-
ing human rights, rule of law and peace in international
relations? Since the EC Treaty, and amendments of its
"treaty constitution," were ratified in EC member states by
means of constitutional law-making procedures: Do these
constitutional and democratic checks on the treaty-making
process not offer democratic legitimacy to the jurisprudence
of EC and national courts to recognize the direct effect, le-
gal primacy, and "direct applicability" of precise and
unconditional EC guarantees of freedom and non-
discrimination for the benefit of EC citizens? Does the judi-
27. Jackson, supra note 14, at 325. See also the concept of "efficient breach" used by J.
Jackson and A.O. Sykes in JOHN H. JACKSON & ALAN 0. SYKES, IMPLEMENTING THE URU-
GUAY ROUND 463 (1997).
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cial protection, for instance by the EC Court of Justice and
the European Court of Human Rights, of internationally
agreed freedoms, duly ratified by national parliaments, not
also serve "democratic functions" for protecting citizens
against the centuries-old tradition of discriminatory foreign
policy measures?
Are there not dangerous constitutional risks of John's pref-
erence for legislative freedom to "transform" international
treaty obligations into domestic legislation? Which other
constitutional instruments, apart from strict respect for in-
ternational treaties ratified by national parliaments, can
ensure international rule of law and protect citizens against
the risk that foreign policy discretion will be abused by
powerful interest groups and "rent-seekers" (including peri-
odically elected members of parliament) for discriminating
also among domestic citizens (e.g., depending upon the
country origin of their imports, or the country destination of
their exports)? How to overcome the international
"prisoner's dilemma" that perceived short-term gains from
nationalist "Smoot-Hawley legislation" may trigger inter-
national retaliation and reduce the welfare of all citizens?
The philosopher Kant once said that, just as it is unlikely that people
will stop breathing so as to avoid dirty air, it is unlikely that they will
cease philosophizing in view of "the love which the reasonable being
has for the supreme ends of human reason." It is also unlikely that John
and myself will stop discussing the constitutional challenges of modern
global integration on our future walks along the lake of Geneva. John
may not consider himself a philosopher, and certainly not one in the
Kantian tradition. Yet, John's pragmatism seems to be rooted also in the
Kantian belief that "out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight
thing can ever be made." Today's international postwar constitution re-
sembles "crooked timber" that has grown slowly over more than fifty
years, "like a tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural
limits" (as it was said by Lord Sankey about the Canadian Constitution).
From previous walks, I recall how much John enjoys watching the trees
in the beautiful parks around the GAT and WTO headquarters at Ge-
neva, just as he enjoys observing, analyzing and influencing the
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evolution of the worldwide "WTO constitution."2 On occasions like the
annual night-time fireworks at Geneva-which I watched the first time
back in 1981 together with John, Joan and their three daugthers at the
lakeside close to the GATT building-John's self-disciplined and hard-
working habits may become very relaxed and he might agree even with
the romantic Kantian observation: "Two things fill the mind with ever
new and increasing wonder and awe, the more often and the more seri-
ously reflection concentrates upon them: the starry heaven above me
and the moral law within me." Yet, reconciling the moral law with the
laws of nature so as to promote national and international constitutional
order for the benefit of the citizens is likely to remain the primary pre-
occupation of John in the years to come. For this challenging task, and
for John's and Joan's joint pursuit of happiness, I wish them both all the
best and many happy returns to Geneva.
28. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITU-
TION AND JURISPRUDENCE (1998).
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